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The Gretley defendants were found guilty in August 2004. They were sentenced in 
March 2005. In an unrelated case another mining company, Powercoal, and one of its 
managers, were found guilty in November 2004. The companies concerned mounted  
appeals to the NSW Court of Appeal court, arguing that the NSW OHS Act was 
unconstitutional and a radical departure from established legal rights and principles. 
At the time of writing, one of these appeals has been dismissed1.  
 
The convictions also triggered a far more widespread response. An organisation 
calling itself Employers First mounted a campaign specifically against the NSW 
legislation2. It claimed that  
 
“There is no doubt that employers/directors/managers who have failed to 
provide perfectly safe workplaces with zero risk, will be sent to gaol – after 
having been deemed guilty before they even go to court, denied the presumption 
of innocence and the right to a jury trial, suffered the reverse onus of proof and 
the suicidal job of trying to prove the impossible defences under the Act”3  
 
The Institute of Public Affairs, which describes itself as Australia’s leading free 
market think tank, also weighed into the fray, complaining that under existing NSW 
law, managers “are presumed guilty until proved otherwise. Incredibly, they have to 
prove they are innocent”4. 
 
The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) released a major policy 
statement profoundly critical of occupational health and safety legislation in 
Australia, both the way in was drafted and the way it was being interpreted. The 
Chamber’s statement did not refer specifically to Gretley, but the text emphasized the 
situation in the state of NSW. ACCI’s statement was described as a blueprint for the 
next ten years and among the reasons it gave for releasing its blueprint at this time 
was the following: 
 
“There is a lack of balance in some existing legislation and court decisions. The 
trend across jurisdictions has been to broaden legal duties beyond reasonable 
limits, increase penalties, extend liability to individuals in the management and 
supply chain and to seek to punish rather than prevent”5.  
 
The ACCI’s statement is the most detailed criticism to have been made in the 
campaign and this chapter will seek to evaluate some of its arguments. I address in 
particular its claims about:  
• reasonableness  
• the reverse onus of proof in criminal matters. 











It will be recalled that the standard of reasonable foreseeability that was applied in the 
Gretley case was such that most ordinary mine managers would not qualify as 
reasonable. The ACCI took up this theme: 
 
“The concepts of ‘reasonably practicable, ‘foreseeable’ and ‘control’ have been 
significantly distorted in several Australian jurisdictions, to the point where they 
no longer reflect was is reasonable, practicable and achievable”6
 
It continued: “To foresee the unforeseeable, to know the unknowable and to control 
the uncontrollable is simply not reasonable”. 
 
These statements were obviously inspired by the situation in NSW and specifically 
the findings in the Gretley prosecution. ACCI is implicitly arguing that the Gretley 
judge was expecting the managers and surveyor to foresee the unforeseeable, or 
perhaps, more precisely to foresee what was not reasonably foreseeable. 
 
It is important to note that this issue goes beyond the Gretley case, indeed beyond 
OHS law. The law of negligence has moved well away from the idea of the 
reasonable person as simply an ordinary person. The point was made very 
dramatically in the high court some decades ago7.  
 
“There has been a tendency in cases of this type to forget the legal standard of 
reasonable care, and to regard the standard employer as a person possessing 
super-human qualities of imagination and foresight…. it is wrong to take as the 
standard of comparison a person of infinite-resource-and-sagacity.” 
 
According to another judge, the hypothetical reasonable person has been “attributed 
with the agility of an acrobat and the foresight of a Hebrew profit”8.  
 
Most recently, in 2005, a High Court judge again  bemoaned the state of Australian 
law in this area. An earlier judgement by three justices of the High court had “held 
that any risk, however remote or even extremely unlikely its realisation may be, that is 
not far-fetched or fanciful, is foreseeable”. 9 Reluctantly, he said, he was bound by 
this rule, and he went on: 
 
“With enough imagination and pessimism it is possible to foresee that 
practically any misadventure, from mishap to catastrophe is just around the 
corner… The line between a risk that is remote or extremely unlikely to be 
realised and one that is far-fetched and fanciful is very difficult to draw. The 
propounding of the rule relating to foreseeabilty in the terms (above)… requires 
everyone to be a Jeremiah (the Judean prophet of doom)”  
 
Given that there has been no shortage of judicial critics of the way in which the 
reasonable person test has been interpreted, the question is: why has this happened? 
Why have the reasonable and the ordinary person diverged to such an extent?  
 
One of the purposes of the law of negligence is to ensure that when a person is 
harmed as a result of someone else’s negligence, the person who is harmed receives 
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compensation from the negligent party. Those who run the risk of being sued for 
damages in this way are very often insured. Actions for damages can thus be seen as 
distributing the loss by shifting it to the ensured party, and thence to all those in the 
insurance pool. It has been argued that this is has become the primary purpose of the 
law in this area10. The higher the standard of care that the courts require, the greater 
the chance that the defendant will be found negligent and hence the greater the chance 
that the victim will receive compensation. There is therefore a tendency over time for 
courts to impose higher standards of care in order to achieve this outcome. Judges 
have acknowledged that this is what they are doing and have argued this is “ a 
convenient and desirable means of achieving this policy objective”11. But , as Luntz 
and Hambly note12, when used as a justification to achieve this end, the test becomes 
“an idealised ethical standard, rather than the behaviour of the actual ‘man in the 
street’”.  
 
An aside on the litigious society 
 
The preceding discussion helps account for the “culture of litigation” which has arisen 
in contemporary society. The former chief justice of the High Court, Sir Harry Gibbs, 
has written critically about this culture and his views are worth quoting at some 
length13.  
 
“Until after the first half of the twentieth century, people were disposed to 
accept mischance as part of life… There has been a steady development in the 
community of the belief that if someone suffers an injury someone else must be 
responsible and must be liable to pay compensation… The intoxicated customer 
of a club who goes outside and is struck by a motor vehicle sues the club; the 
worker who is mugged while leaving his place of employment sues the 
employer; the person injured while playing sport sues the organiser of the game 
or the person who devised the rules; the youth who sustains injury by diving into 
shallow water sues the local Council or the owner of the land from which he 
dived. The injured person does not put it down to bad luck, or blame himself, 
but blames someone who can be sued.” 
 
There is he says, an “unhealthy culture of blame, with (an) emphasis on rights rather 
than responsibilities”. 
 
Gibbs goes on to deride a section of the legal fraternity which has exploited this 
situation: 
 
“The culture of litigation has been fostered by some lawyers who, whenever a 
mishap occurs, advertise for potential claimants and encourage them to sue or to 
join in a class action. These activities would once have been regarded as 
unprofessional… It would, however, be too much to hope that any ban on 
advertising or touting for work by lawyers would change the culture of blame 
which is now well established in society. The lawyers jumped on the 
bandwagon; they did not start it.” 
 
Gibbs’ comments suggest that the problem is one of moral decline on the part of the 
citizenry, a refusal to accept responsibility for our own part in misfortune that befalls 
us, even an unwillingness to accept that life is inherently risky.  
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He is not alone in making these points. Social anthropologist Mary Douglas observes: 
“we are ... almost ready to treat every death as chargeable to someone’s account, 
every accident as caused by someone’s criminal negligence, every sickness a 
threatened prosecution. Whose fault? is the first question”14  
 
Gibbs is no doubt right when he talks of the rise of a culture of litigation, but his 
suggestion, and that of Douglas, that this represents a moral decline, misses an 
important point. When people suffer accidents they may incur substantial financial 
loss. Were there a universal accident compensation scheme, they could apply to this 
scheme to make good the loss. There is no such scheme in this country, so the only 
way in which they can make good the loss is if a court finds that some other party, 
preferably an insured party, is responsible. In short, however imperfectly, the law of 
negligence is filling a gap in the welfare system. The so called litigious nature of 
modern society is better explained by these institutional arrangements than it is by the 
moral failings of modern individuals.  
 
Despite the analysis which Gibbs offers of the culture of litigation in terms of moral 
failure, he recognises that this culture could be combatted by replacing negligence law 
with a no fault injury compensation scheme15. This would be fairer than the current 
system, he says, for at present, an injured person who can find some one to blame is 
compensated while the person who can’t, receives nothing. 
  
There is, then, an irony here. The real reason for the culture of litigation is not the 
moral decline of the citizenry. Nor is it the ambulance chasing lawyers. It is the 
judges themselves who have created this culture. Their purpose has been to 
compensate people for injury in circumstances where they would otherwise receive 
nothing, and to achieve this end they have developed the fiction of the reasonable 
person who is considerably wiser than the ordinary traveller on the London 
underground or, as one Australian judge put it, “the hypothetical person on the 
hypothetical Bondi tram”16. By finding that duty holders have failed to comply with 
an idealised standard, judges have been able to ensure that the financial losses 
associated with injury are distributed and do not fall disproportionately on the injured 
party. The culture of litigation is an unintended consequence of this policy.  
 
The reasonable person in OHS law 
 
Whereas a major aim of the law of negligence discussed above is to ensure that 
injured parties are compensated, occupational health and safety law uses the concept 
of negligence to determine liability for punishment. Organisations must do what is 
reasonably practicable. Failure to do so is negligent, and is punishable. Senior 
managers must exercise due diligence. Failure to do so is negligent, and punishable.  
In short the civil law concept of negligence has become a basis for criminal 
liabililty17.  
 
Consider now the consequences of this transfer from the civil to the criminal arena. In 
civil actions for damages, to say that one party is at fault for failure to exhibit 
exceptional foresight achieves the policy purpose of spreading the loss. It does not 
result in any social condemnation or stigma of the party said to be at fault. The idea of 
fault here is somewhat artificial. But where such a finding of fault can result in 
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punishment, particularly the punishment of an individual, as in the case of OHS law, 
matters are different. To say that a person is at fault for failure to exhibit exceptional 
foresight, does indeed smack of injustice. To punish senior managers in these 
circumstances does seem unfair. 
 
To put this in the context of the Gretley case, the reasonable manager and the 
reasonable surveyor, whom the judge in the Gretley prosecution had in mind, were 
people of unusual foresight. Ordinary managers and surveyors in the circumstances 
would probably have behaved the same way that the Gretley managers and surveyors 
behaved when initially provided with the plans by the department, that is, they would 
have accepted them as accurate. To punish the individual Gretley defendants for 
behaving in this way seems unfair. However, the situation was quite different in the 
days immediately prior to the accident when the indicators of danger began to emerge. 
At this point the risk was not only reasonably foreseeable, it was foreseen. Had the 
prosecution focused on this, in the way that the earlier inquiry did, the divergence 
between the reasonable and the ordinary mine official would not have become the 
issue that it was. Individuals might then have been convicted, without the sense of 
injustice that surrounded the judgments actually made.  
 
To summarise, the comments made by the Australian Chamber of Commerce about 
holding individuals culpable for failure to live up to an idealized reasonable person 
standard have merit. There is indeed a need for some modification in the law in this 
respect. Later chapters will take up this question and propose an alternative.  
 
The reverse onus of proof 
 
The campaign by the ACCI and other parties expressed great concern about the so 
called reversal of the onus of proof in the NSW OHS Act. As noted earlier, the 
Institute of Public Affairs expressed outrage about this. Under the Act, it said, 
managers “are presumed guilty until proved otherwise. Incredibly, they have to prove 
they are innocent”.This, it was suggested, was contrary to the basic principles of 
criminal law. The ACCI policy paper included the following comment: 
. 
“Nor should there be a deemed guilt or reverse onus of proof in any civil or 
criminal proceedings for OHS breaches, nor any other basis on which 
employers, directors, management personnel or employees are treated less 
favourably than the defendants in prosecutions under any other equivalent law 
or legislation… All parties charged with OHS offences should be accorded 
natural justice and, in criminal cases, the standard presumptions and protections 
of the general criminal law”18
 
There are two ways in which the NSW Act reverses the onus of proof. The first is in 
relation to major duty holders, such as employers. These will normally be 
corporations. The second is in relation to individual senior officers of the corporation. 
I deal, first, with the corporate level.  
 
A central provision of Section 8 of the Act is the following:  
 
“An employer must ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of all 
employees of the employer”19
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This is for the prosecution to prove, and it must do so according to the normal 
criminal standard, beyond reasonable doubt. Once this is established the Act Section 
28 provides the following defence 
 
“It is a defence to any proceeding against a person for an offence against a 
provision of the Act or the regulations if the person proves that 
 
(a) it was not reasonably practicable for the person to comply with the 
provision, or  
(b) the commission of the offence was due to causes over which the person 
had no control and against the happening of which it was it impracticable 
for the person to make provision”20
 
It is subsection (a) that is relevant here. The defendant does not need to establish the 
case with the rigour that is imposed on the prosecution. It must prove its point only to 
the civil standard, that is, on the balance of probabilities21. In other words it must 
show that its claim is more probable than not. This is not an onerous requirement. If it 
truly was not reasonably practicable for the defendant company to comply with the 
section, it should be relatively easy for it to establish the point. Nevertheless, in theory 
the situation involves a stark reversal of the onus of proof, with defendants required to 
establish their innocence22. 
 
The reason for reversing the onus in NSW appears to be largely a practical one.  
 
“(I)t is more efficient for the holder of the duty of care rather than the 
prosecution to have to establish what was reasonably practicable. A duty holder 
could be expected to know more about the costs and benefits of the various 
alternatives open to him or her at any time, than anyone else.”23
 
The reverse onus also applies in relation to certain personal defendants. Section 26 
deems certain individuals to be guilty whenever the corporation is guilty, in the 
following terms:  
 
(1) If a corporation contravenes … any provision of this Act … each director of 
the corporation, and each person concerned in the management of the 
corporation, is taken to have contravened the same provision unless the director 
or person satisfies the court that:  
(a) he or she was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in 
relation to its contravention …, or  
(b) he or she, being in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the 
contravention...  
 
The fact that individuals are deemed guilty in this way means that there is no need for 
the prosecution to prove anything, except that the person was concerned in the 
management of the corporation. This must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the 
Gretley case, managers and surveyors were found to be persons concerned in the 
management of the corporation, but the prosecution failed to convince the judge that 
shift managers were such persons. 
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Section 28 also provides a defence. The relevant element is that the defendant used all 
due diligence to prevent the offence by the corporation, that is, exercised an 
appropriate level of care. This is for the defendant to prove, but again, he or she needs 
only do this on the balance of probabilities to avoid conviction. In principle, this 
should be relatively straight forward, if the defendant did indeed use all due diligence. 
Certain other Australian jurisdictions reverse the onus of proof in this way so NSW is 
not unique in this. Again the justification for the reversal would seem to be that it is 
easier for the defendant than the prosecution to present the necessary information. 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the phrase reverse onus of proof is somewhat 
misleading. It suggests a transfer to the defendant of the burden of proof normally 
carried by the prosecution. The situation is not symmetrical however. The defendant 
does not have to prove innocence as conclusively as the prosecution must normally 
prove guilt.  
 
In any case, it can be argued that the matter is of little practical significance, at least it 
appeared not to be in the Gretley case. This is so because the Gretley trial did not 
work in the way formally envisaged in the Act. Consider first the corporate 
defendants. The judge did state formally that “the defendants have failed to discharge 
the onus placed on them” of proving that it was not reasonably practicable to ensure 
safety24. But the reality was that the prosecution had not simply left it to the defence 
to establish this point. It had shouldered the onus itself and taken very active measures 
to prove that it was reasonably practicable for the companies to avoided the breach. It 
called two expert witnesses who described what reasonable managers and surveyors 
would have done. Reasonable surveyors would not have relied on the plans provided 
by the Department and reasonable managers would have probed their surveyors 
actions more carefully. The judge accepted this evidence.25 Furthermore he found that 
the evidence provided by the prosecution demonstrated that the defendants had not 
behaved in accordance with this model of reasonable behaviour.26 In short the 
prosecution itself established to the satisfaction of the judge that the companies had 
not done what was reasonably practicable. It did not simply assume reasonable 
practicability and leave it to the defence to prove otherwise; it actively set out to 
prove that the companies had not done what was reasonably practicable and the judge 
found the prosecution evidence to be compelling. It can be concluded that even if the 
Act had formally placed the onus on the prosecution to establish reasonable 
practicability, the outcome of the trial would not have been much different, in relation 
to corporate defendants. 
 
The situation was much the same with respect to the personal defendants. The 
discussion above treats the behaviour of the surveyors and managers as the behaviour 
of the companies. This is in accordance with the established principle that “a 
corporate employer can only conduct its activities through human agents such as 
managers, supervisors, employees and contractors”27. The company was convicted, in 
part, on the basis of the behaviour of these individuals. In the Gretley case this same 
behaviour resulted in charges against the individuals as well.  
 
The onus of proof was formally on them to establish that they had exercised all due 
diligence. The judge found that that they had failed to produce any such evidence. On 
the contrary the evidence produced by the prosecution established that they had not 
exercised all due diligence28. As in the case of the companies, then, even if the onus 
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had been on the prosecution to prove that these individuals had failed to act with due 
diligence, the outcome would probably have been little different. In the Gretley case 
the issue of just where the onus of proof lay turns out to have been a red herring.  
 
The reverse onus in the criminal law 
 
The critics assert that reversing the onus of proof, as is done in occupational health 
and safety law, is contrary to basic principles of criminal law. The fact is, however, 
that whatever the principles of the criminal law may be, in practice there are many 
instances where the onus of proof is reversed in order to achieve policy/regulatory 
objectives. It is worth outlining some of these instances, so as to put the whole debate 
about reverse onus in a broader context. 
 
The NSW summary Offences Act make it an offence to live on the earnings of 
prostitution. How is the prosecution to prove that a person who lives with a prostitute 
is living on the earnings of prostitution? The issue is resolved by assuming that this is 
the case, unless the defendant can show that he or she has lawful means of support 
(See box below). It this way the onus of proof is reversed and the defendant is 
required to establish his innocence. Notice, moreover, that the offence is a serious 
one, in that the maximum penalty is 12 months in gaol. Even so, the law is willing to 





NSW SUMMARY OFFENCES ACT 1988 – SECT 15  
Living on earnings of prostitution 
 
(1) A person shall not knowingly live… on the earnings of prostitution of another person. 
Max penalty: 10 penalty units or 12 months prison. 
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person who … 
(a) lives with or is habitually in the company of, a reputed prostitute, and  
(b) has no visible lawful means of support, 
shall be taken knowingly to live… on the earnings of prostitution… 
 unless he or she satisfies the court… that he or she has sufficient lawful means of support.  
 
A second example from the same Act concerns the possession of knives in public 
places, particularly in schools. The provision makes it an offence to carry a knife 
unless the person concerned can provide a reasonable excuse. Here again the onus is 
on the accused to prove their innocence. And here again, the offence is not trivial; it 




NSW SUMMARY OFFENCES ACT 1988 - SECT 11C  
Custody of knife in public place or school 
 
(1) A person must not, without reasonable excuse (proof of which lies on the person), 
have in his or her custody a knife in a public place or a school. 
 
Maximum penalty: 5 penalty units or, in the case of a person dealt with previously for 
a knife-related offence, 10 penalty units or imprisonment for 12 months, or both.  
 
 
Consider, next, drug law. The law normally treats possession of a drug for the 
purposes of sale as a more serious offence than possession for one’s own use. But 
how can the prosecution establish that the accused intended to sell the drugs found in 
his possession? In the Australian Capital Territory the problem is solved by simply 
assuming that any quantity of drugs above a certain threshold is intended for sale. The 
accused is however given the opportunity to rebut this assumption. (See box below). 















 ACT DRUGS OF DEPENDENCE ACT 1989 - SECT 160 
 
(8) For the purposes of this section,  
where a person has more than a traffickable quantity of... Marijuana (100 grams)...
in his possession,  
 
it shall be presumed that the possession is for the purpose of sale or supply to 
another person,  
 
but that presumption is rebuttable. he onus of proof is also reversed for financial offences committed by company 
irectors. Where a company is insolvent, that is, unable to pay its debts, directors have 
 duty to prevent the company from incurring further debts. If a company does incur a 
ebt while insolvent, its directors are guilty of an offence unless they can prove they 
ad reasonable grounds to think the company was solvent or, if they suspected that it 
as insolvent, that they took reasonable steps to prevent it trading (see box below). 
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 CORPORATIONS ACT 2001- SECT 588H  
Defences  
 
(2) It is a defence if it is proved that, at the time when the debt was incurred, the 
person had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the company was 
solvent at that time …. 
 
(5) It is a defence if it is proved that the person took all reasonable steps to prevent 
the company from incurring the debt. 
 
These examples could be multiplied29. They show that OHS law is not in any way 
unique in placing the onus of proof on defendants to prove certain things in order to 
avoid conviction. The critics claim that the reversal of the onus of proof under the 
OHS Act is unjust. If that is so, then many other statutes are unjust in the same way. 
The fact is that effective law enforcement relies of placing the onus of proof on 
defendants in various circumstances. Governments have decided that holding senior 
officers personally liable for safety offences committed by their companies, unless 
they can show that they exercised due diligence, is an effective way of encouraging 
corporate compliance. Whether this is indeed the best way to achieve this outcome 




The ACCI policy statement was very critical of the absolute liability imposed on 
employers by the NSW Act. An absolute duty, it says, is “hostile to the common law 
intent and to common sense”30. 
 
What does absolute liability mean? An offence is one of absolute liability if it is 
defined independently of any question of fault or blameworthiness.31 For example, 
motorists who exceed the speed limit are guilty of an offence regardless of whether 
they realise that they are doing so32. For the prosecution to have to prove that 
motorists knew what the limit was and knew that they were exceeding it would make 
the law unenforceable. 
 
Absolute liability is not limited to what might be described as regulatory offences, 
such as exceeding speed limits. There are absolute liability offences in the traditional 
criminal law, offences that can result long terms of imprisonment. Suppose a person 
intentionally inflicts serious harm on another, but without intending to kill the victim 
or foreseeing that the victim might die. Suppose the victim subsequently dies. The 
attacker is then absolutely liable for the death and is guilty of murder even though, in 
a significant sense, the death was accidental.33 Like it or not, absolute liability is a 
feature of the criminal law34. 
 
To return to the ACCI policy statement, it quotes the following judicial comment on 
the absolute nature of the NSW OHS Act  
 
“The duties imposed by the Act are not merely duties to act as a reasonable or 
prudent person would in the same circumstances... Under s15(1) the obligation 
of the employer is “to ensure” the health, safety and welfare of employees at 
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work. There is no warrant for limiting the detriments to safety contemplated by 
that provision, to those of which are reasonably foreseeable… the terms of 
s15(1) specify that the obligation under that section is a strict or absolute 
liability to ensure that employees are not exposed to risks to health or safety”.35
 
From an employer’s point of view, this is a horrifying statement. It creates the very 
understandable impression that the law will hold employers liable and punishable in 
the event that an employee is injured or killed, regardless of whether the employer is 
at fault.  
 
This is an incorrect impression, and it is worth commenting on how this 
misconception comes about. There is a fundamental distinction in the criminal law 
between, on one hand, the elements of an offence that the prosecution must prove and, 
on the other, matters which it is for the defendant to establish. These different 
components are often widely separated in the legislation, with the elements the 
prosecution must prove towards the beginning the Act and the defences available to 
the defendant spelt out in sections towards the end. Nevertheless, these different 
components need to be read together to understand the nature of the offence. 
Applying this to the NSW OHS Act, the offence, as a whole, is failure to maintain a 
safe workplace so far as reasonably practicable. The prosecution’s task is to prove that 
the defendant breached its duty to maintain a safe work place. It does not have to 
consider whether the defendant is at fault. In this particular sense the duty is absolute. 
It is then for the defendant to establish, if possible, that it was not reasonably 
practicable to avoid the breach. In other words, it is for the defendant to establish that 
it36 was not at fault, always remembering that this need be done only on the balance of 
probabilities, not an especially onerous burden. The offence as a whole is thus not one 
of absolute liability; a defendant will only be found guilty if the breach was indeed its 
fault. To repeat, the duty to maintain a safe workplace is absolute only in the sense 
that the prosecution does not need to establish fault in order to find that the duty has 
been breached, but a conviction is only possible after considerations of fault have 
been canvassed.37  
 
It can be seen, then, that the statement quoted above by the ACCI is only half the 
story. It refers only to section 15(1), which spells out the duty, and says nothing about 
the defence provided at the end of the Act in section 5338. This is not to criticise the 
ACCI. Its omission is entirely understandable. The architecture of the Act is 
thoroughly confusing to those who have not studied it closely and judges contribute to 
the confusion by making statements about the duties imposed on defendants without 
at the same time making reference to the defences available to them. But the upshot of 
this discussion is that the concerns of the ACCI and others have expressed about 




The campaign triggered by the Gretley convictions centred on three specific concerns 
about the way the NSW OHS Act has been formulated and interpreted: the legal 
concept of reasonableness, the reverse onus of proof and absolute nature of the duty 
of care. I have argued the critics are right in pointing to the fact that the reasonable 
person envisaged in the law is not in fact the ordinary person and that to punish 
people for failing to live up to an ideal can create a sense of injustice. Holding senior 
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managers accountable for the health and safety performance of their organisation is 
entirely appropriate, but it is not always appropriate to assume that they are at fault 
when the organisation fails to manage risk effectively. Later chapters will explore 
ways of holding senior managers accountable without assuming personal fault. 
 
The other two concerns – the reverse onus and the absolute nature of the duty – have 
been shown to be of little substance. The offence as a whole does not impose absolute 
liability and the reverse onus of proof does not constitute a problem, in and of itself. 
The defendants in the Gretley prosecution were unable to demonstrate that they had 
acted reasonably, but this was not because they bore the onus of proof. It was because 
they had not in fact acted reasonably, according to the legal definition of 
reasonableness. Had the legal notion of reasonableness been more in accordance with 
common usage, the defendants in the Gretley case would not have had much difficulty 
establishing that they behaved reasonably in relation to the plans provided by the 
department. However, even using a common sense meaning of reasonableness, it is 
far from clear that the response to the warning signs was reasonable. Had the 
prosecution highlighted these issues, the defendants would have been hard pressed to 
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